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- Gregory Sidak 
- Expertise  
- Publications  
- Articles  - A FRAND Contract’s Intended Third-Party Beneficiary 
- Tournaments and FRAND Royalties 
- The Value of a Standard Versus the Value of Standardization 
- Evading Portfolio Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Through Validity Challenges 
- Ongoing Royalties for Patent Infringement 
- Comments of Amici Curiae J. Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog in Support of Neither Party in Response to the Board’s Request for Additional Briefing Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(d)  
- Maximizing the U.S. Postal Service’s Profits from Competitive Products 
- Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses After Ericsson v. D-Link 
- Brief for Amici Curiae J. Gregory Sidak, Robert D. Willig, David J. Teece, and Keith N. Hylton Scholars and Experts in Antitrust Economics in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Supporting Reversal 
- Comments on the Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property Under the Antimonopoly Act (Draft) 
- Attack of the Shorting Bass: Does the Inter Partes Review Process Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns? 
- Comments on the Updated Draft Version of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines 
- Reply of J. Gregory Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics, to the Written Submission of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez of the Federal Trade Commission on the Public Interest 
- How Licensing a Portfolio of Standard-Essential Patents Is Like Buying a Car 
- Bargaining Power and Patent Damages 
- Two Economic Rationales for Felony Murder 
- FRAND in India: The Delhi High Court’s Emerging Jurisprudence on Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents 
- The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents 
- Did Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rates Help Entrants Gain Market Share? 
- Did Separating Openreach from British Telecom Benefit Consumers? 
- Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers? 
- The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions 
- Proposed IEEE Bylaw Amendments Affecting FRAND Licensing of SEPs 
- The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages 
- Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents 
- Submission of Comments of J. Gregory Sidak Regarding Fair, Reasonable, and Nondiscriminatory Royalties and Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents 
- The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties 
- Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts 
- Is Harm Ever Irreparable? 
- Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro 
- Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Non-Infringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate 
- Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Network Industries 
- Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries 
- Antitrust Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers 
- The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement 
- Rethinking Antitrust Damages 
- The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then? 
- The Misuse of Profit Margins to Infer Market Power 
- The Use of Proportional Market Shares as Estimates of Diversion Ratios in Merger Analysis 
- What Does the Chicago School Teach About Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google? 
- The OECD’s Proposal to Cartelize Mexican Telecommunications 
- How Does the Experience of U.S. Telecommunications Regulation Inform the Forced Sharing of Intellectual Property Rights under Global Competition Law? 
- Declaration of Economists and Antitrust Scholars on Behalf of Radiomóvil Dipsa S.A. de C.V (Telcel) 
- Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law 
- Rewriting the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the Name of Dynamic Competition 
- Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books 
- Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting Organizations 
- Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite 
- Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability 
- Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of the Petitioners, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc. 
- Should Antitrust Consent Decrees Regulate Post-Merger Pricing? 
- The Future of the Postal Monopoly: American and European Perspectives After the Presidential Commission and Flamingo Industries 
- European and American Approaches to Antitrust Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Telecommunications 
- Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises 
- Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises 
- Is Structural Separation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition? 
- Does Bell Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit Consumers? 
- Capital Subsidies, Profit Maximization, and Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Telecommunications Carriers 
- Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Firms: The Case of Deutsche Telekom and Voicestream 
- An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration 
- Are Public Enterprises the Only Credible Predators? 
- A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications 
- Essential Facilities 
- Monopoly and the Mandate of Canada Post 
- Competition and Regulatory Policies for Interactive Broadband Networks 
- Debunking Predatory Innovation 
- The Fallacy of “Equal Treatment” in Brazil’s Bill of Rights for Internet Users 
- The Impact of Multisided Markets on the Debate over Optional Transactions for Enhanced Delivery over the Internet 
- Innovation Spillovers and the “Dirt Road” Fallacy: The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Banning Optional Transactions for Enhanced Delivery Over the Internet 
- Are Regulators Forward-Looking? The Market Price of Copper Versus the Regulated Price of Mandatory Access to Unbundled Local Loops in Telecommunications Networks 
- What Is the Network Neutrality Debate Really About? 
- Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators 
- When Does an Optional Tariff Not Lead to a Pareto Improvement? The Ambiguous Effects of Self-Selecting Nonlinear Pricing When Demand Is Interdependent or Firms Do Not Maximize Profit 
- A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet 
- Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate 
- Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose? Empirical Evidence from Five Countries 
- Should Regulators Set Rates to Terminate Calls on Mobile Networks? 
- Uberregulation Without Economics: The World Trade Organization’s Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services 
- Do States Tax Wireless Services Inefficiently? Evidence on the Price Elasticity of Demand 
- Why Do the Poor and the Less-Educated Pay More for Long-Distance Calls? 
- An Economic Theory of Censorship 
- Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity: Does TELRIC Pricing Increase Risk for Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers? 
- The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation 
- Interim Pricing of Local Loop Unbundling in Ireland: Epilogue 
- Exporting Telecommunications Regulation: The U.S.-Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing 
- How Can Regulators Set Nonarbitrary Interim Rates? The Case of Local Loop Unbundling in Ireland 
- The Empirical Case Against Asymmetric Regulation of Broadband Internet Access 
- Why Did the U.S. Telecommunications Industry Collapse? 
- Residential Demand for Broadband Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers 
- Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling 
- A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks 
- Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries 
- Cyberjam: The Law and Economics of Internet Congestion of the Telephone Network 
- Network Access Pricing and Deregulation 
- The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
- Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract 
- The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors 
- Telecommunications in Jericho 
- The “New Payola” and the American Record Industry: Transactions Costs and Precautionary Ignorance in Contracts for Illicit Services 
- The Pig in the Python: Is Lumpy Capacity Investment Used and Useful? 
- The Efficient Allocation of Proceeds from a Utility’s Sale of Assets 
- Stranded Costs 
- Takeover Premiums, Appraisal Rights and the Price Elasticity of a Firm’s Publicly Traded Stock 
- Corporate Takeovers, the Commerce Clause, and the Efficient Anonymity of Shareholders 
- What Is Wrong with American Telecommunications? 
- Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs 
- Video Games: Serious Business for America's Economy 
- Antitrust and the IEEE’s Bylaw Amendments 
- The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: Rejoinder and Epilogue 
- The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors 
- How Relevant Is Justice Cardozo's “Book of Wisdom” to Patent Damages? 
- Comments on the Revised Draft Amendments to the Patent Law 
- Comments on the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights 
- Evaluating Market Power Using Competitive Benchmark Prices Instead of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
- Economists as Arbitrators 
- Injunctive Relief and the FRAND Commitment in the United States 
- Does the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Violate Due Process as Applied? 
- Brief of Leading Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
- Using Conjoint Analysis to Apportion Patent Damages 
- Addendum to Attack of the Shorting Bass: Does the Inter Partes Review Process Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns? 
- FRAND in India 
- Memorandum on Standard-Essential Patents 
- International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents 
- Abolishing the Letter-Box Monopoly 
- Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents 
- Is Uber Unconstitutional? 
- Does the International Trade Commission Facilitate Patent Holdup? 
- International Settlement Rates and U.S. Exportation of “Procompetitive Deregulatory Principles” After the WTO Agreement on Telecommunications Services 
- What Aggregate Royalty Do Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License Standard-Essential Patents? 
- Converting Royalty Payment Structures for Patent Licenses 
- Competition in Colombian Telecommunications 
- Two-Sided Market Definition and Competitive Effects for Credit Cards After United States v. American Express 
- Enhanced Damages for Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents 
- How Commissioner Vestager’s Mistaken Views on Standard-Essential Patents Illustrate Why President Trump Needs a Unified Policy on Antitrust and Innovation 
- Irreparable Harm from Patent Infringement 
- Is Harm Ever Irreparable? 
- The Tempting of American Antitrust Law: An Open Letter to President Trump 
- Protecting Competition from the Postal Monopoly 
- TCPA Declaration in Support of Quicken Loan's Motion to Deny Class Certification 
- Is a FRAND Royalty a Point or a Range? 
- Using Regression Analysis of Observed Licenses to Calculate a Reasonable Royalty for Patent Infringement 
- Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Encumbered by a FRAND or RAND Commitment 
- Hedonic Prices and Patent Royalties 
- EquitiesFirst 
- Comments on the Japan Guidelines for Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard-Essential Patents 
- Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers 
- Does Video Delivered Over a Telephone Network Require a Cable Franchise? 
- Brief for Amici Curiae J. Gregory Sidak and Robert D. Willig in Support of Respondents 
- Brief for Amicus Curiae J. Gregory Sidak in Support of Petitioner 
- The FRAND Contract 
- Making the Postal Service Great Again 
- Citation Weighting, Patent Ranking, and Apportionment of Value for Standard-Essential Patents  
- Will the CJEU's Decision in MEO Change FRAND Disputes Globally? 
- Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Economists, Antitrust Scholars, and Former Government Antitrust Officials in Support of Appellees and Supporting Affirmance 
- Is Patent Holdup a Hoax? 
- Is Professor Salop Right That Judge Leon Bungled United States v. AT&T? 
- Why Unwired Planet Might Revolutionize the Resolution of FRAND Licensing Disputes 
- Brief for Amici Curiae 37 Economists, Antitrust Scholars, and Former Government Antitrust Officials in Support of Appellees and Supporting Affirmance 
- Memorandum: Will the International Trade Commission or the Antitrust Division Set Policy on Monopoly and Innovation? 
- Letter from Judge Ken Starr to Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Concerning Conflict Between the International Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division Over Monopoly and Innovation 
- Judge Selna’s Errors in TCL v. Ericsson Concerning Apportionment, Nondiscrimination, and Royalties Under the FRAND Contract 
- Hedonic Prices for Multicomponent Products 
- Hedonic Prices and Patent Royalties: Epilogue 
- Proposed Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Guidelines on the Repeal of Subsection 51(3) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
- Misconceptions Concerning the Use of Hedonic Prices to Determine FRAND or RAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents 
- Transition Bonds for Stranded Costs 
- What Makes FRAND Fair? The Just Price, Contract Formation, and the Division of Surplus from Voluntary Exchange 
- Capitalism, Socialism, and the Constitution 
- Negotiating FRAND Licenses in Good Faith 
- An Economic Theory of Censorship Revisited 
- The Legislator-in-Chief 
- Mr. Justice Nemo's Social Statics 
- True God of the Next Justice 
- The Petty Larceny of the Police Power 
- The Line-Item Veto Amendment 
- The Quasi War Cases—and Their Relevance to Whether  
- The Price of Experience: The Constitution After September 11, 2001 
- Why Did President Bush Repudiate the “Inherent” Line-Item Veto? 
- War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens 
- The Inverse Coase Theorem and Declarations of War 
- To Declare War 
- The President's Power of the Purse 
- Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland 
- The Recommendation Clause 
- Why Should the Postal Service Deter Amazon’s Competitive Entry into Last-Mile Parcel Delivery? 
- Monopoly, Innovation, and Due Process: FTC v. Qualcomm and the Imperative to Destroy 
- How the COVID-19 Pandemic Accelerated the Transformation of the U.S. Postal Service into a State-Owned Package-Delivery Enterprise—and Why Policymakers Must Respond 
- The Pig in the Python Revisited: Is Lumpy Capital Investment Used and Useful? 
- The Law of n+1 
- Brief of Amicus Curiae J. Gregory Sidak in Support of Appellees  
- Brief of J. Gregory Sidak and David J. Teece as Amici Curiae in Support of Facebook 
- The Fair Division of Surplus from a FRAND License Negotiated in Good Faith 
- EquitiesFirst 
 
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