Is Professor Salop Right That Judge Leon Bungled United States v. AT&T?, 3 Criterion Journal on Innovation 249 (2018).Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Economists, Antitrust Scholars, and Former Government Antitrust Officials in Support of Appellees and Supporting Affirmance, United States v. AT&T, Inc., U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Sept. 26, 2018) (No. 18-5214).
Making the Postal Service Great Again, 3 Criterion Journal on Innovation 101 (2018).Brief for Amici Curiae J. Gregory Sidak and Robert D. Willig in Support of Respondents, State of Ohio v. American Express Co., No. 16-1454, Supreme Court of the United States (Jan. 23, 2018), 2018 WL 565325.
Did Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rates Help Entrants Gain Market Share?, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 701 (2017).
The Tempting of American Antitrust Law: An Open Letter to President Trump, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 201 (2017).
Brief for Amicus Curiae J. Gregory Sidak in Support of Petitioner, United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Postal Regulatory Commission, Nos. 16-1354, 16-1419, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Feb. 10, 2017), 2017 WL 2618024.
Two-Sided Market Definition and Competitive Effects for Credit Cards After United States v. American Express, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1301 (2016).
International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents, 26 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 125 (2016).
FRAND in India, forthcoming in 1 Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Antitrust and Patents (Jorge L. Contreras ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017).
Injunctive Relief and the FRAND Commitment in the United States, forthcoming in 1 Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Antitrust and Patents (Jorge L. Contreras ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017).
A FRAND Contract’s Intended Third-Party Beneficiary, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1001 (2016).
Competition in Colombian Telecommunications, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 801 (2016).
How Commissioner Vestager's Mistaken Views on Standard-Essential Patents Illustrate Why President Trump Needs a Unified Policy on Antitrust and Innovation, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 721 (2016).
What Aggregate Royalty Do Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License Standard-Essential Patents?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 701 (2016).
Does the International Trade Commission Facilitate Patent Holdup?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 601 (2016).
International Settlement Rates and U.S. Exportation of “Procompetitive Deregulatory Principles” After the WTO Agreement on Telecommunications Services, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 501 (2016).
Abolishing the Letter-Box Monopoly, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 401 (2016).
Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 301 (2016).
Evading Portfolio Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Through Validity Challenges, 39 World Competition 191 (2016).
The Value of a Standard Versus the Value of Standardization, 68 Baylor Law Review 59 (2016).
Is Uber Unconstitutional?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 179 (2016).
Memorandum on Standard-Essential Patents, Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (Mar. 30, 2016).
Tournaments and FRAND Royalties, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 101 (2016).
Brief of Leading Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Nazarian v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, Nos. 14-614, 14-623, Supreme Court of the United States (Jan. 19, 2016), 2016 WL 344492.
Comments on the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights, National Development and Reform Commission (Jan. 18, 2016).
Comments on the Revised Draft Amendments to the Patent Law, State Council Legislative Affairs Office of the People’s Republic of China (Dec. 29, 2015).
Antitrust and the IEEE’s Bylaw Amendments (Keynote Address at the 2015 IEEE-SIIT Conference, Oct. 6, 2015).
Maximizing the U.S. Postal Service’s Profits from Competitive Products, 11 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 617 (2015).
Brief for Amici Curiae J. Gregory Sidak, Robert D. Willig, David J. Teece, and Keith N. Hylton Scholars and Experts in Antitrust Economics in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Supporting Reversal, United States v. American Express Co., No. 15-1672, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Aug. 10, 2015), 2015 WL 4873717.
Comments on the Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property Under the Antimonopoly Act (Draft), Japan Fair Trade Commission (July 28, 2015).
Comments on the Updated Draft Version of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines, Canadian Competition Bureau (July 28, 2015).
The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 104 Georgetown Law Journal Online 48 (2015).
Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers?, 52 San Diego Law Review 619 (2015).The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions, 11 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 201 (2015).
Letter from J. Gregory Sidak to the Hon. Renata B. Hesse Regarding the Business Review Letter for the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Concerning Proposed Bylaw Amendments Affecting FRAND Licensing of Standard-Essential Patents (Jan. 28, 2015).
Did Separating Openreach from British Telecom Benefit Consumers?, 38 World Competition: Law & Economics Review 31 (2015).
The Misuse of Profit Margins to Infer Market Power, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 511 (2013).
The Use of Proportional Market Shares as Estimates of Diversion Ratios in Merger Analysis, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 231 (2013) (Andrew P. Vassallo, Senior Consultant, Criterion Economics).
What Does the Chicago School Teach About Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 663 (2012).
The OECD’s Proposal to Cartelize Mexican Telecommunications, Competition Policy International Special Issue (June 2012). Spanish translation republished in El Trimestre Económico.
How Does the Experience of U.S. Telecommunications Regulation Inform the Forced Sharing of Intellectual Property Rights Under Global Competition Law?, Criterion Economics Working Paper (2012).
Declaration of Economists and Antitrust Scholars on Behalf of Radiomóvil Dipsa S.A. de C.V (Telcel), Reconsideration Recourse, RA-007-2011, Case File No. DE-37-2006, Comisión Federal de Competencia (United Mexican States) (Oct. 14, 2011).
Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 581 (2009).
Rewriting the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the Name of Dynamic Competition, 16 George Mason Law Review 885 (2009).
Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 411 (2009).
Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard Setting Organizations, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 123 (2009).
Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger, 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 697 (2008).
Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 279 (2008).
Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of the Petitioners, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., No. 07-512, Supreme Court of the United States (Sept. 4, 2008), 2008 WL 4125499.
Should Antitrust Consent Decrees Regulate Post-Merger Pricing?, 3 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 471 (2007).
Evaluating Market Power Using Competitive Benchmark Prices Instead of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 74 Antitrust Law Journal 387 (2007).
The Future of the Postal Monopoly: American and European Perspectives After the Presidential Commission and Flamingo Industries, 28 World Competition 163 (2005).
European and American Approaches to Antitrust Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Telecommunications, Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Vol. 2, Technology Evolution and the Internet 517 (2003).
Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises, 71 Antitrust Law Journal 479 (2003).
Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises, 22 Review of Industrial Organization 183 (2003).
Is Structural Separation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 Yale Journal on Regulation 335 (2002).
Does Bell Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit Consumers?, 70 Antitrust Law Journal 463 (2002).
Capital Subsidies, Profit Maximization, and Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Telecommunications Carriers, 26 Telecommunications Policy 287 (2002).
Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Firms: The Case of Deutsche Telekom and VoiceStream, 54 Federal Communications Law Journal 1 (2001).
An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (2001).
Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 University of Chicago Law Review 1 (2001).
Are Public Enterprises the Only Credible Predators?, 67 University of Chicago Law Review 271 (2000).
A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications, 50 Hastings Law Journal 1639 (1999).
Essential Facilities, 51 Stanford Law Review 1185 (1999) (Facilidades Esenciales, 27 Ius et Veritas 126 (2004)).
Monopoly and the Mandate of Canada Post, 14 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (1997).
Protecting Competition from the Postal Monopoly (AEI Press 1996).
Competition and Regulatory Policies for Interactive Broadband Networks, 68 Southern California Law Review 1203 (1995).
Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 Columbia Law Review 1121 (1983).
Antitrust Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, 30 Kansas Law Review 491 (1982).
Rethinking Antitrust Damages, 33 Stanford Law Review 329 (1981).
The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 Journal of Political Economy 429 (1981).
The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 Georgetown Law Journal 1131 (1980).