The Tempting of American Antitrust Law: An Open Letter to President Trump, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 201 (2017).
Is Harm Ever Irreparable?, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 7 (2017).
Irreparable Harm from Patent Infringement, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2017).
International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents, 26 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 125 (2016).
Does the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Violate Due Process as Applied?, 68 Florida Law Review 1403 (2016).
FRAND in India, forthcoming in 1 Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Antitrust and Patents (Jorge L. Contreras ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017).
Injunctive Relief and the FRAND Commitment in the United States, forthcoming in 1 Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Antitrust and Patents (Jorge L. Contreras ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017).
Ongoing Royalties for Patent Infringement, 24 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 161 (2016).
Enhanced Damages for Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1101 (2016).
A FRAND Contract’s Intended Third-Party Beneficiary, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1001 (2016).
Converting Royalty Payment Structures for Patent Licenses, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 901 (2016).
How Commissioner Vestager's Mistaken Views on Standard-Essential Patents Illustrate Why President Trump Needs a Unified Policy on Antitrust and Innovation, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 721 (2016).
What Aggregate Royalty Do Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License Standard-Essential Patents?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 701 (2016).
Does the International Trade Commission Facilitate Patent Holdup?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 601 (2016).
Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses After Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 University of Illinois Law Review 1809.Using Conjoint Analysis to Apportion Patent Damages, 25 Federal Circuit Bar Journal 581 (2016).
Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 301 (2016).
Evading Portfolio Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Through Validity Challenges, 39 World Competition 191 (2016).
The Value of a Standard Versus the Value of Standardization, 68 Baylor Law Review 59 (2016).
Is Uber Unconstitutional?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 179 (2016).
Memorandum on Standard-Essential Patents, Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (Mar. 30, 2016).
How Relevant Is Justice Cardozo’s “Book of Wisdom” to Patent Damages?, 17 Columbia Science & Technology Law Review 246 (2016).
Addendum to Attack of the Shorting Bass: Does the Inter Partes Review Process Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns? (Criterion Economics Working Paper, Feb. 8, 2016).
Comments on the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights, National Development and Reform Commission (Jan. 18, 2016).
Tournaments and FRAND Royalties, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 101 (2016).
Comments on the Revised Draft Amendments to the Patent Law, State Council Legislative Affairs Office of the People’s Republic of China (Dec. 29, 2015).
Antitrust and the IEEE’s Bylaw Amendments (Keynote Address at the 2015 IEEE-SIIT Conference, Oct. 6, 2015).
Comments of Amici Curiae J. Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog in Support of Neither Party in Response to the Board’s Request for Additional Briefing Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(d), Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. NPS Pharmaceuticals, Inc., IPR No. 2015-00990 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 18, 2015).
Attack of the Shorting Bass: Does the Inter Partes Review Process Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns?, 63 UCLA Law Review Discourse 120 (2015).
Comments on the Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property Under the Antimonopoly Act (Draft), Japan Fair Trade Commission (July 28, 2015).
Comments on the Updated Draft Version of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines, Canadian Competition Bureau (July 28, 2015).
Reply of J. Gregory Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics, to the Written Submission of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez of the Federal Trade Commission on the Public Interest, U.S. ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-613 (Remand) (July 20, 2015).
Bargaining Power and Patent Damages, 19 Stanford Technology Law Review 1 (2015).
FRAND in India: The Delhi High Court’s Emerging Jurisprudence on Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 10 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 609 (2015).
How Licensing a Portfolio of Standard-Essential Patents Is Like Buying a Car, World Intellectual Property Organization Magazine 10 (June 2015).
The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 104 Georgetown Law Journal Online 48 (2015).
The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions, 11 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 201 (2015).
Letter from J. Gregory Sidak to the Hon. Renata B. Hesse Regarding the Business Review Letter for the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Concerning Proposed Bylaw Amendments Affecting FRAND Licensing of Standard-Essential Patents (Jan. 28, 2015).
Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 18 Stanford Technology Law Review 1 (2015).
The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 989 (2014).
Submission of Comments of J. Gregory Sidak Regarding Fair, Reasonable, and Nondiscriminatory Royalties and Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents, Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Property High Court of Japan], Case 2013 (ne) no. 10043 (filed Mar. 24, 2014).
The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 931 (2013).
Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 359 (2013).
Apple v. Motorola: Implications for Patent Damages, Law360 (June 29, 2012).
How Does the Experience of U.S. Telecommunications Regulation Inform the Forced Sharing of Intellectual Property Rights Under Global Competition Law?, Criterion Economics Working Paper (2012).
Is Harm Ever Irreparable?, Inaugural Address for the Ronald Coase Professorship of Law and Economics, Tilburg University (Sept. 16, 2011).
Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 581 (2009).
Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 411 (2009).
Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard Setting Organizations, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 123 (2009).
Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 Minnesota Law Review 713 (2008).
Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Non-Infringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 825 (2007).