Damages, Royalties, Injunctions & Fines
The FRAND Contract, 3 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2018).Comments on the Japan Guidelines for Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard-Essential Patents, Japan Patent Office (Nov. 1, 2017).
Hedonic Prices and Patent Royalties, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 601 (2017).
Using Regression Analysis of Observed Licenses to Calculate a Reasonable Royalty for Patent Infringement, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 501 (2017).
Is a FRAND Royalty a Point or a Range?, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 401 (2017).
Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Encumbered by a FRAND or RAND Commitment, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 301 (2017).
The Tempting of American Antitrust Law: An Open Letter to President Trump, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 201 (2017).
Is Harm Ever Irreparable?, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 7 (2017).
Irreparable Harm from Patent Infringement, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2017).
International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents, 26 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 125 (2016).
Does the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Violate Due Process as Applied?, 68 Florida Law Review 1403 (2016).
FRAND in India, in 1 Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Antitrust and Patents 336 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2018).
Injunctive Relief and the FRAND Commitment in the United States, in 1 Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Antitrust and Patents 389 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2018).
Ongoing Royalties for Patent Infringement, 24 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 161 (2016).
Enhanced Damages for Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1101 (2016).
A FRAND Contract’s Intended Third-Party Beneficiary, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1001 (2016).
Converting Royalty Payment Structures for Patent Licenses, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 901 (2016).
Competition in Colombian Telecommunications, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 801 (2016).
How Commissioner Vestager's Mistaken Views on Standard-Essential Patents Illustrate Why President Trump Needs a Unified Policy on Antitrust and Innovation, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 721 (2016).
What Aggregate Royalty Do Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License Standard-Essential Patents?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 701 (2016).
Does the International Trade Commission Facilitate Patent Holdup?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 601 (2016).
Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses After Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 University of Illinois Law Review 1809.
International Settlement Rates and U.S. Exportation of “Procompetitive Deregulatory Principles” After the WTO Agreement on Telecommunications Services, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 501 (2016).
Using Conjoint Analysis to Apportion Patent Damages, 25 Federal Circuit Bar Journal 581 (2016).
Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 301 (2016).
Evading Portfolio Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Through Validity Challenges, 39 World Competition 191 (2016).
The Value of a Standard Versus the Value of Standardization, 68 Baylor Law Review 59 (2016).
Is Uber Unconstitutional?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 179 (2016).
Memorandum on Standard-Essential Patents, Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (Mar. 30, 2016).
Brief of Leading Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Nazarian v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, Nos. 14-614, 14-623, Supreme Court of the United States (Jan. 19, 2016), 2016 WL 344492.
Comments on the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights, National Development and Reform Commission (Jan. 18, 2016).
Comments on the Revised Draft Amendments to the Patent Law, State Council Legislative Affairs Office of the People’s Republic of China (Dec. 29, 2015).
How Relevant Is Justice Cardozo’s “Book of Wisdom” to Patent Damages?, 17 Columbia Science & Technology Law Review 246 (2016).
Tournaments and FRAND Royalties, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 101 (2016).
Two Economic Rationales for Felony Murder, 2016 Cornell Law Review Online 52.
Economists as Arbitrators, 30 Emory International Law Review 2105 (2016).
Antitrust and the IEEE’s Bylaw Amendments (Keynote Address at the 2015 IEEE-SIIT Conference, Oct. 6, 2015).
Comments of Amici Curiae J. Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog in Support of Neither Party in Response to the Board’s Request for Additional Briefing Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(d), Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. NPS Pharmaceuticals, Inc., IPR No. 2015-00990 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 18, 2015).
Brief for Amici Curiae J. Gregory Sidak, Robert D. Willig, David J. Teece, and Keith N. Hylton Scholars and Experts in Antitrust Economics in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Supporting Reversal, United States v. American Express Co., No. 15-1672, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Aug. 10, 2015), 2015 WL 4873717.
Comments on the Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property Under the Antimonopoly Act (Draft), Japan Fair Trade Commission (July 28, 2015).
Comments on the Updated Draft Version of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines, Canadian Competition Bureau (July 28, 2015).
Reply of J. Gregory Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics, to the Written Submission of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez of the Federal Trade Commission on the Public Interest, U.S. ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-613 (Remand) (July 20, 2015).
Bargaining Power and Patent Damages, 19 Stanford Technology Law Review 1 (2015).
FRAND in India: The Delhi High Court’s Emerging Jurisprudence on Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 10 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 609 (2015).
How Licensing a Portfolio of Standard-Essential Patents Is Like Buying a Car, World Intellectual Property Organization Magazine 10 (June 2015).
The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 104 Georgetown Law Journal Online 48 (2015).
The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions, 11 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 201 (2015).
Letter from J. Gregory Sidak to the Hon. Renata B. Hesse Regarding the Business Review Letter for the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Concerning Proposed Bylaw Amendments Affecting FRAND Licensing of Standard-Essential Patents (Jan. 28, 2015).
The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 989 (2014).
Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 18 Stanford Technology Law Review 1 (2014).
Submission of Comments of J. Gregory Sidak Regarding Fair, Reasonable, and Nondiscriminatory Royalties and Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents , Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Property High Court of Japan], Case 2013 (ne) no. 10043 (filed Mar. 24, 2014).
The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 931 (2013).
Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 359 (2013).
Apple v. Motorola: Implications for Patent Damages, Law360 (June 29, 2012).
Is Harm Ever Irreparable?, Inaugural Address for the Ronald Coase Professorship of Law and Economics, Tilburg University (Sept. 16, 2011).
Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro , 92 Minnesota Law Review 714 (2008).
Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Noninfringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate , 22 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 825 (2007).
Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Network Industries , 2003 Michigan State DCL Law Review 741 (2003).
Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 University of Chicago Law Review 1 (2001).
Antitrust Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, 30 Kansas Law Review 492 (1982).
The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 Journal of Political Economy 429 (1981).
Rethinking Antitrust Damages, 33 Stanford Law Review 329 (1981).
The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then? , 68 Georgetown Law Journal 1131 (1980).