Articles

A FRAND Contract’s Intended Third-Party Beneficiary Tournaments and FRAND Royalties The Value of a Standard Versus the Value of Standardization Evading Portfolio Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Through Validity Challenges Ongoing Royalties for Patent Infringement Comments of Amici Curiae J. Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog in Support of Neither Party in Response to the Board’s Request for Additional Briefing Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(d) Maximizing the U.S. Postal Service’s Profits from Competitive Products Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses After Ericsson v. D-Link Brief for Amici Curiae J. Gregory Sidak, Robert D. Willig, David J. Teece, and Keith N. Hylton Scholars and Experts in Antitrust Economics in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Supporting Reversal Comments on the Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property Under the Antimonopoly Act (Draft) Attack of the Shorting Bass: Does the Inter Partes Review Process Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns? Economists as Arbitrators Comments on the Updated Draft Version of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines Reply of J. Gregory Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics, to the Written Submission of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez of the Federal Trade Commission on the Public Interest How Licensing a Portfolio of Standard-Essential Patents Is Like Buying a Car Bargaining Power and Patent Damages Two Economic Rationales for Felony Murder FRAND in India: The Delhi High Court’s Emerging Jurisprudence on Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents Did Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rates Help Entrants Gain Market Share? Did Separating Openreach from British Telecom Benefit Consumers? Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers? The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions Proposed IEEE Bylaw Amendments Affecting FRAND Licensing of SEPs The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Submission of Comments of J. Gregory Sidak Regarding Fair, Reasonable, and Nondiscriminatory Royalties and Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts Is Harm Ever Irreparable? Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Non-Infringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Network Industries Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries Antitrust Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement Rethinking Antitrust Damages The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then? The Misuse of Profit Margins to Infer Market Power The Use of Proportional Market Shares as Estimates of Diversion Ratios in Merger Analysis What Does the Chicago School Teach About Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google? The OECD’s Proposal to Cartelize Mexican Telecommunications How Does the Experience of U.S. Telecommunications Regulation Inform the Forced Sharing of Intellectual Property Rights under Global Competition Law? Declaration of Economists and Antitrust Scholars on Behalf of Radiomóvil Dipsa S.A. de C.V (Telcel) Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law Rewriting the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the Name of Dynamic Competition Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting Organizations Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of the Petitioners, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc. Should Antitrust Consent Decrees Regulate Post-Merger Pricing? Evaluating Market Power Using Competitive Benchmark Prices Instead of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index The Future of the Postal Monopoly: American and European Perspectives After the Presidential Commission and Flamingo Industries European and American Approaches to Antitrust Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Telecommunications Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises Is Structural Separation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition? Does Bell Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit Consumers? Capital Subsidies, Profit Maximization, and Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Telecommunications Carriers Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Firms: The Case of Deutsche Telekom and Voicestream An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration Are Public Enterprises the Only Credible Predators? A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications Essential Facilities Monopoly and the Mandate of Canada Post Competition and Regulatory Policies for Interactive Broadband Networks Debunking Predatory Innovation The Fallacy of “Equal Treatment” in Brazil’s Bill of Rights for Internet Users The Impact of Multisided Markets on the Debate over Optional Transactions for Enhanced Delivery over the Internet Innovation Spillovers and the “Dirt Road” Fallacy: The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Banning Optional Transactions for Enhanced Delivery Over the Internet Are Regulators Forward-Looking? The Market Price of Copper Versus the Regulated Price of Mandatory Access to Unbundled Local Loops in Telecommunications Networks What Is the Network Neutrality Debate Really About? Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators When Does an Optional Tariff Not Lead to a Pareto Improvement? The Ambiguous Effects of Self-Selecting Nonlinear Pricing When Demand Is Interdependent or Firms Do Not Maximize Profit A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose? Empirical Evidence from Five Countries Should Regulators Set Rates to Terminate Calls on Mobile Networks? Uberregulation Without Economics: The World Trade Organization’s Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services Do States Tax Wireless Services Inefficiently? Evidence on the Price Elasticity of Demand Why Do the Poor and the Less-Educated Pay More for Long-Distance Calls? An Economic Theory of Censorship Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity: Does TELRIC Pricing Increase Risk for Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers? The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation Interim Pricing of Local Loop Unbundling in Ireland: Epilogue Exporting Telecommunications Regulation: The U.S.-Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing How Can Regulators Set Nonarbitrary Interim Rates? The Case of Local Loop Unbundling in Ireland The Empirical Case Against Asymmetric Regulation of Broadband Internet Access Why Did the U.S. Telecommunications Industry Collapse? Residential Demand for Broadband Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries Cyberjam: The Law and Economics of Internet Congestion of the Telephone Network Network Access Pricing and Deregulation The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors Telecommunications in Jericho The “New Payola” and the American Record Industry: Transactions Costs and Precautionary Ignorance in Contracts for Illicit Services The Pig in the Python: Is Lumpy Capacity Investment Used and Useful? The Efficient Allocation of Proceeds from a Utility’s Sale of Assets Stranded Costs Takeover Premiums, Appraisal Rights and the Price Elasticity of a Firm’s Publicly Traded Stock Corporate Takeovers, the Commerce Clause, and the Efficient Anonymity of Shareholders What Is Wrong with American Telecommunications? Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs Video Games: Serious Business for America's Economy Antitrust and the IEEE’s Bylaw Amendments The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: Rejoinder and Epilogue The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors How Relevant Is Justice Cardozo's “Book of Wisdom” to Patent Damages? Comments on the Revised Draft Amendments to the Patent Law Comments on the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights Evaluating Market Power Using Competitive Benchmark Prices Instead of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Economists as Arbitrators Injunctive Relief and the FRAND Commitment in the United States Does the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Violate Due Process as Applied? Brief of Leading Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents Using Conjoint Analysis to Apportion Patent Damages Addendum to Attack of the Shorting Bass: Does the Inter Partes Review Process Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns? FRAND in India Memorandum on Standard-Essential Patents Using the Economic Theory of Investment to Prove whether a Domestic Industry Exists in a Section 337 Patent Infringement Investigation Before the U.S. International Trade Commission International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents Abolishing the Letter-Box Monopoly Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Is Uber Unconstitutional? Does the International Trade Commission Facilitate Patent Holdup? International Settlement Rates and U.S. Exportation of “Procompetitive Deregulatory Principles” After the WTO Agreement on Telecommunications Services What Aggregate Royalty Do Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License Standard-Essential Patents? Converting Royalty Payment Structures for Patent Licenses Competition in Colombian Telecommunications Two-Sided Market Definition and Competitive Effects for Credit Cards After United States v. American Express Enhanced Damages for Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents How Commissioner Vestager’s Mistaken Views on Standard-Essential Patents Illustrate Why President Trump Needs a Unified Policy on Antitrust and Innovation Irreparable Harm from Patent Infringement Is Harm Ever Irreparable? The Tempting of American Antitrust Law: An Open Letter to President Trump Protecting Competition from the Postal Monopoly