Schadevergoeding, Royalties, Verbodsacties & Boetes

Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents (Criterion Economics working paper, June 16, 2014).

Submission of Comments of J. Gregory Sidak Regarding Fair, Reasonable, and Nondiscriminatory Royalties and Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents, Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Property High Court of Japan], Case 2013 (ne) no. 10043 (filed Mar. 24, 2014).

The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 931 (2013).

Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 359 (2013).

Apple v. Motorola: Implications for Patent Damages, Law360 (June 29, 2012).

Is Harm Ever Irreparable?, Inaugural Address for the Ronald Coase Professorship of Law and Economics, Tilburg University (Sept. 16, 2011).

Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 Minnesota Law Review 714 (2008).

Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Noninfringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 825 (2007).

Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Network Industries, 2003 Michigan State DCL Law Review 741 (2003).

Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 University of Chicago Law Review 1 (2001).

Antitrust Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, 30 Kansas Law Review 492 (1982).

The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 Journal of Political Economics 429 (1981).

Rethinking Antitrust Damages, 33 Stanford Law Review 329 (1981).

The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 Georgetown Law Journal 1131 (1980).