Propiedad Intelectual

Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents (Criterion Economics working paper, June 16, 2014).

Submission of Comments of J. Gregory Sidak Regarding Fair, Reasonable, and Nondiscriminatory Royalties and Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents, Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Property High Court of Japan], Case 2013 (ne) no. 10043 (filed Mar. 24, 2014).

The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties [El Significado de “FRAND”, Parte I: Royalties], 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 931 (2013).

Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts [Expertos Neutrales Nombrados por el Tribunal], 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 359 (2013).

Apple v. Motorola: Implications for Patent Damages, Law360 (June 29, 2012).

How Does the Experience of U.S. Telecommunications Regulation Inform the Forced Sharing of Intellectual Property Rights Under Global Competition Law? [Maneras en que la experiencia de regulación de telecomunicaciones en Estados Unidos influye en la participación forzada de derechos de propiedad intelectual bajo los derechos de la competencia mundial], Criterion Economics Working Paper (2012).

Is Harm Ever Irreparable? [¿Puede el Daño ser Irreparable?], Inaugural Address for the Ronald Coase Professorship of Law and Economics, Tilburg University (Sept. 16, 2011).

Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law [Competencia dinámica bajo el Derecho de la competencia], 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 581 (2009).

Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books [Google y el Escrutinio Antimonopolio Adecuado de los Libros Huérfanos], 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 411 (2009).

Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard Setting Organizations [“Patent Holdup” y Colusión Oligopsonica entre las Organizaciones que Elaboran Normas Técnicas], 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 123 (2009).

Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro [Holdup, Royalty Stacking, y la Presunción de Concesión de Medida Cautelar por Violación de Patentes: Una Respuesta a Lemley y Shapiro], 92 Minnesota Law Review 713 (2008).

Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Non-Infringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate [Daños de Patentes y Opciones Reales: Como la Caracterización Judicial de Alternativas no Infractoras Reducen los Incentivos para Innovar], 22 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 825 (2007).