The Misuse of Profit Margins to Infer Market Power, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 511 (2013), co-authored with Robert H. Bork.
The Use of Proportional Market Shares as Estimates of Diversion Ratios in Merger Analysis, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 231 (2013) (Andrew P. Vassallo, Senior Consultant, Criterion Economics).
What Does The Chicago School Teach About Internet Search And The Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 663 (2012).
The OECD’s Proposal to Cartelize Mexican Telecommunications, Competition Policy International Special Issue (June 2012). Spanish translation republished in El Trimestre Económico.
How Does the Experience of U.S. Telecommunications Regulation Inform the Forced Sharing of Intellectual Property Rights Under Global Competition Law?, Criterion Economics Working Paper (2012).
Declaration of Economists and Antitrust Scholars on Behalf of Radiomóvil Dipsa S.A. de C.V (Telcel), Reconsideration Recourse, RA-007-2011, Case File No. DE-37-2006, Comisión Federal de Competencia (United Mexican States) (Oct. 14, 2011).
Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 581 (2009).
Rewriting the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the Name of Dynamic Competition, 16 George Mason Law Review 885 (2009).
Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 411 (2009).
Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard Setting Organizations, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 123 (2009).
Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger, 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 697 (2008).
Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 279 (2008).
Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of the Petitioners, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., Supreme Court of the United States, No. 07-512 (filed Sept. 4, 2008).
Should Antitrust Consent Decrees Regulate Post-Merger Pricing?, 3 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 471 (2007).
Evaluating Market Power Using Competitive Benchmark Prices Instead of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, 74 Antitrust Law Journal 387 (2007).
The Future of the Postal Monopoly: American and European Perspectives After the Presidential Commission and Flamingo Industries, 28 World Competition 163 (2005).
European and American Approaches to Antitrust Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Telecommunications, Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Vol. 2, Technology Evolution and the Internet 517 (2003).
Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises, 71 Antitrust Law Journal 479 (2003).
Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises, 22 Review of Industrial Organization 183 (2003).
Is Structural Separation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 Yale Journal on Regulation 335 (2002).
Does Bell Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit Consumers?, 70 Antitrust Law Journal 463 (2002).
Capital Subsidies, Profit Maximization, and Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Telecommunications Carriers, 26 Telecommunications Policy 287 (2002).
Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Firms: The Case of Deutsche Telekom and VoiceStream, 54 Federal Communications Law Journal 1 (2001).
An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (2001).
Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 University of Chicago Law Review 1 (2001).
Are Public Enterprises the Only Credible Predators?, 67 University of Chicago Law Review 271 (2000).
A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications, 50 Hastings Law Journal 1639 (1999).
Essential Facilities, 51 Stanford Law Review 1185 (1999) (Facilidades Esenciales, 27 Ius et Veritas 126 (2004)).
Monopoly and the Mandate of Canada Post, 14 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (1997).
Competition and Regulatory Policies for Interactive Broadband Networks, 68 Southern California Law Review 1203 (1995).
Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 Columbia Law Review 1121 (1983).
Antitrust Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, 30 Kansas Law Review 491 (1982).
Rethinking Antitrust Damages, 33 Stanford Law Review 329 (1981).
The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 Journal of Political Economy 429 (1981).
The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 Georgetown Law Journal 1131 (1980).