Intellectual Property

The Fair Division of Surplus from a FRAND License Negotiated in Good Faith, in 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things (Jonathan M. Barnett & Sean M. O’Connor eds., Cambridge Univ. Press forthcoming 2022).

Brief of J. Gregory Sidak and David J. Teece as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee, State of New York v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 21-7078, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Mar. 28, 2022).

Brief for Amicus Curiae J. Gregory Sidak in Support of Appellees, In re Epipen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Marketing, Sales Practices and Antitrust Litigation (Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC v. Mylan, Inc.), No. 21-3005, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Sept. 22, 2021).

The Law of n+1, 7 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2021).

Monopoly, Innovation, and Due Process: FTC v. Qualcomm and the Imperative to Destroy, 6 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2020).

Negotiating FRAND Licenses in Good Faith, 5 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2020).

What Makes FRAND Fair? The Just Price, Contract Formation, and the Division of Surplus from Voluntary Exchange, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 701 (2019).

Misconceptions Concerning the Use of Hedonic Prices to Determine FRAND or RAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 501 (2019).

Letter from J. Gregory Sidak to Parnos Munyard Regarding Comments on the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s Draft Guidelines on the Repeal of Subsection 51(3) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (July 19, 2019).

Hedonic Prices and Patent Royalties: Epilogue, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 401 (2019).

Hedonic Prices for Multicomponent Products, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 301 (2019).

Judge Selna’s Errors in TCL v. Ericsson Concerning Apportionment, Nondiscrimination, and Royalties Under the FRAND Contract, 4 Criterion Journal on Innovation 101 (2019).

Letter from Judge Ken Starr to Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Concerning Conflict Between the International Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division Over Monopoly and Innovation (Dec. 11, 2018).

Memorandum: Will the International Trade Commission or the Antitrust Division Set Policy on Monopoly and Innovation?, 3 Criterion Journal on Innovation 701 (2018).

Why Unwired Planet Might Revolutionize the Resolution of FRAND Licensing Disputes, 3 Criterion Journal on Innovation 601 (2018).

Is Patent Holdup a Hoax?, 3 Criterion Journal on Innovation 401 (2018).

Will the CJEU’s Decision in MEO Change FRAND Disputes Globally?, 3 Criterion Journal on Innovation 301 (2018).

Citation Weighting, Patent Ranking, and Apportionment of Value for Standard-Essential Patents, 3 Criterion Journal on Innovation 201 (2018).

The FRAND Contract, 3 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2018).

Comments on the Japan Guidelines for Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard-Essential Patents, Japan Patent Office (Nov. 1, 2017).

Hedonic Prices and Patent Royalties, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 601 (2017).

Using Regression Analysis of Observed Licenses to Calculate a Reasonable Royalty for Patent Infringement, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 501 (2017).

Is a FRAND Royalty a Point or a Range?, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 401 (2017).

Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Encumbered by a FRAND or RAND Commitment, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 301 (2017).

The Tempting of American Antitrust Law: An Open Letter to President Trump, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 201 (2017).

Is Harm Ever Irreparable?, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 7 (2017).

Irreparable Harm from Patent Infringement, 2 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2017).

International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents, 26 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 125 (2016).

Does the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Violate Due Process as Applied?, 68 Florida Law Review 1403 (2016).

FRAND in India, in 1 Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Antitrust and Patents 336 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2018).

Injunctive Relief and the FRAND Commitment in the United States, in 1 Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Antitrust and Patents 389 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017).

Ongoing Royalties for Patent Infringement, 24 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 161 (2016).

Enhanced Damages for Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1101 (2016).

A FRAND Contract’s Intended Third-Party Beneficiary, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 1001 (2016).

Converting Royalty Payment Structures for Patent Licenses, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 901 (2016).

How Commissioner Vestager's Mistaken Views on Standard-Essential Patents Illustrate Why President Trump Needs a Unified Policy on Antitrust and Innovation, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 721 (2016).

What Aggregate Royalty Do Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License Standard-Essential Patents?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 701 (2016).

Does the International Trade Commission Facilitate Patent Holdup?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 601 (2016).

Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses After Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 University of Illinois Law Review 1809.

Using Conjoint Analysis to Apportion Patent Damages, 25 Federal Circuit Bar Journal 581 (2016).

Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 301 (2016).

Evading Portfolio Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents Through Validity Challenges, 39 World Competition 191 (2016).

The Value of a Standard Versus the Value of Standardization, 68 Baylor Law Review 59 (2016).

Is Uber Unconstitutional?, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 179 (2016).

Memorandum on Standard-Essential Patents, Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (Mar. 30, 2016).

How Relevant Is Justice Cardozo’s “Book of Wisdom” to Patent Damages?, 17 Columbia Science & Technology Law Review 246 (2016).

Addendum to Attack of the Shorting Bass: Does the Inter Partes Review Process Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns? (Criterion Economics Working Paper, Feb. 8, 2016).

Comments on the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights, National Development and Reform Commission (Jan. 18, 2016).

Tournaments and FRAND Royalties, 1 Criterion Journal on Innovation 101 (2016).

Comments on the Revised Draft Amendments to the Patent Law, State Council Legislative Affairs Office of the People’s Republic of China (Dec. 29, 2015).

Antitrust and the IEEE’s Bylaw Amendments (Keynote Address at the 2015 IEEE-SIIT Conference, Oct. 6, 2015).

Comments of Amici Curiae J. Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog in Support of Neither Party in Response to the Board’s Request for Additional Briefing Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(d), Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. NPS Pharmaceuticals, Inc., IPR No. 2015-00990 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 18, 2015).

Attack of the Shorting Bass: Does the Inter Partes Review Process Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns?, 63 UCLA Law Review Discourse 120 (2015).

Comments on the Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property Under the Antimonopoly Act (Draft), Japan Fair Trade Commission (July 28, 2015).

Comments on the Updated Draft Version of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines, Canadian Competition Bureau (July 28, 2015).

Reply of J. Gregory Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics, to the Written Submission of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez of the Federal Trade Commission on the Public Interest, U.S. ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-613 (Remand) (July 20, 2015).

Bargaining Power and Patent Damages, 19 Stanford Technology Law Review 1 (2015).

FRAND in India: The Delhi High Court’s Emerging Jurisprudence on Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 10 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 609 (2015).

How Licensing a Portfolio of Standard-Essential Patents Is Like Buying a Car, World Intellectual Property Organization Magazine 10 (June 2015).

The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 104 Georgetown Law Journal Online 48 (2015).

The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions, 11 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 201 (2015).

Letter from J. Gregory Sidak to the Hon. Renata B. Hesse Regarding the Business Review Letter for the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Concerning Proposed Bylaw Amendments Affecting FRAND Licensing of Standard-Essential Patents (Jan. 28, 2015).

Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 18 Stanford Technology Law Review 1 (2015).

The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 989 (2014).

Submission of Comments of J. Gregory Sidak Regarding Fair, Reasonable, and Nondiscriminatory Royalties and Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents, Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Property High Court of Japan], Case 2013 (ne) no. 10043 (filed Mar. 24, 2014).

The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 931 (2013).

Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 359 (2013).

Apple v. Motorola: Implications for Patent Damages, Law360 (June 29, 2012).

Is Harm Ever Irreparable?, Inaugural Address for the Ronald Coase Professorship of Law and Economics, Tilburg University (Sept. 16, 2011).

Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 581 (2009).

Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 411 (2009).

Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard Setting Organizations, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 123 (2009).

Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 Minnesota Law Review 713 (2008).

Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Non-Infringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 825 (2007).