Journal Articles by J. Gregory Sidak
Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 581 (2009), co-authored with David J. Teece.
Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 411 (2009), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman.
Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard Setting Organizations, 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 123 (2009).
Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 279 (2008).
Are Regulators Forward-Looking? The Market Price of Copper Versus the Regulated Price of Mandatory Access to Unbundled Local Loops in Telecommunications Networks, 61 Federal Communications Law Journal 199 (2008), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman and Timothy J. Tariff.
Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 Minnesota Law Review 713 (2008).
Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger, 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 697 (2008), co-authored with Hal J. Singer.
Should Antitrust Consent Decrees Regulate Post-Merger Pricing?, 3 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 471 (2007), co-authored with Farrell Malone.
Evaluating Market Power Using Competitive Benchmark Prices Instead of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, 74 Antitrust Law Journal 387 (2007), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman.
Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators, 6 Review of Network Industries 348 (2007), co-authored with Hal J. Singer.
What Is the Network Neutrality Debate Really About?, 1 International Journal of Communications 377 (2007).
Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Non-Infringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 825 (2007), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman and Gregory K. Leonard.
Does Video Delivered Over a Telephone Network Require a Cable Franchise?, 59 Federal Communications Law Journal 251 (2007), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall and Hal J. Singer.
A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 349 (2006).
When Does an Optional Tariff Not Lead to a Pareto Improvement? The Ambiguous Effects of Self-Selecting Nonlinear Pricing When Demand Is Interdependent or Firms Do Not Maximize Profit, 2 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 285 (2006), co-authored with John C. Panzar.
The Quasi War Cases—and Their Relevance to Whether “Letters of Marque and Reprisal” Constrain Presidential War Powers, 27 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 465 (2005).
The Future of the Postal Monopoly: American and European Perspectives After the Presidential Commission and Flamingo Industries, 28 World Competition 163 (2005), co-authored with Damien Geradin.
Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose? Empirical Evidence from Five Countries, 1 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 173 (2005), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman.
Überregulation without Economics: The World Trade Organization’s Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services, 57 Federal Communications Law Journal 1 (2004), co-authored with Hal J. Singer.
Do States Tax Wireless Services Inefficiently? Evidence on the Price Elasticity of Demand, 24 Virginia Tax Review 249 (2004), co-authored with Allan T. Ingraham.
Why Do the Poor and the Less-Educated Pay More for Long-Distance Calls?, Contributions in Economic and Policy Research, vol. 3, issue 1, article 3 (2004), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman.
Should Regulators Set Rates to Terminate Calls on Mobile Networks?, 21 Yale Journal on Regulation 261 (2004), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall.
Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises, 71 Antitrust Law Journal 479 (2003), co-authored with David E. M. Sappington.
An Economic Theory of Censorship, 11 Supreme Court Economic Review 81 (2003).
Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Network Industries, 2003 Michigan State DCL Law Review 741 (2003).
Interim Pricing of Local Loop Unbundling in Ireland: Epilogue, 4 Journal of Network Industries 119 (2003), co-authored with Hal J. Singer.
The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 Yale Journal on Regulation 207 (2003).
Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity: Does TELRIC Pricing Increase Risk for Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers?, 20 Yale Journal on Regulation 389 (2003), co-authored with Allan T. Ingraham.
Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises, 22 Review of Industrial Organization 183 (2003), co-authored with David E. M. Sappington.
The Price of Experience: The Constitution After September 11, 2001, 19 Constitutional Commentary 37 (2002).
Does Bell Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit Consumers?, 70 Antitrust Law Journal 463 (2002), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman and Gregory K. Leonard.
The Empirical Case Against Asymmetric Regulation of Broadband Internet Access, 17 Berkeley Technology Law Journal l953 (2002), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall and Hal J. Singer.
The Pig in the Python: Is Lumpy Capacity Investment Used and Useful?, 23 Energy Law Journal 383 (2002), co-authored with William J. Baumol.
Exporting Telecommunications Regulation: The U.S.-Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing, 43 Harvard International Law Journal 317 (2002), co-authored with Jeffrey H. Rohlfs.
Is Structural Separation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 Yale Journal on Regulation 335 (2002), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall.
How Can Regulators Set Nonarbitrary Interim Rates? The Case of Local Loop Unbundling in Ireland, 3 Journal of Network Industries 273 (2002), co-authored with Hal J. Singer.
The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 William & Mary Law Review 1 (2002), co-authored with Vasan Kesavan.
Capital Subsidies, Profit Maximization, and Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Telecommunications Carriers, 26 Telecommunications Policy 287 (2002).
Why Did the U.S. Telecommunications Industry Collapse?, 28 Infocom Review 17 (2002) (in Japanese).
The Efficient Allocation of Proceeds from a Utility’s Sale of Assets, 22 Energy Law Journal 233 (2001), co-authored with Paul W. MacAvoy.
Acquisitions by Partially Privatized Firms: The Case of Deutsche Telekom and VoiceStream, 54 Federal Communications Law Journal 1 (2001).
Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 University of Chicago Law Review 1 (2001), co-authored with Howard A. Shelanski.
Mr. Justice Nemo’s Social Statics, 79 Texas Law Review 737 (2001).
An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (2001).
Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers, 91 American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 302 (2001), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman and Hal J. Singer.
True God of the Next Justice, 18 Constitutional Commentary 9 (2001).
Residential Demand for Broadband Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 129 (2001), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman and Hal J. Singer.
Are Public Enterprises the Only Credible Predators?, 67 University of Chicago Law Review 271 (2000), co-authored with David E. M. Sappington.
Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (2000), co-authored with Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece.
A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 Yale Law Journal 417 (1999), co-authored with Jerry A. Hausman.
What Is Wrong with American Telecommunications?, Multimedia Und Recht, Mar. 1999, at 15, co-authored with Paul W. MacAvoy
A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications, 50 Hastings Law Journal 1639 (1999), co-authored with David J. Teece and Hal J. Singer.
Essential Facilities, 51 Stanford Law Review 1185 (1999), co-authored with Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. Spanish translation republished as Facilidades esenciales, 27 Ius 126 (2004).
The Petty Larceny of the Police Power, 86 California Law Review 655 (1998) (review essay).
Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries, 15 Yale Journal on Regulation 117 (1998), co-authored with Daniel F. Spulber.
Cyberjam: The Law and Economics of Internet Congestion of the Telephone Network, 21 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 337 (1998), co-authored with Daniel F. Spulber.
Network Access Pricing and Deregulation, 6 Industrial and Corporate Change 757 (1997), co-authored with Daniel F. Spulber.
Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 New York University Law Review 1068 (1997), co-authored with Daniel F. Spulber.
The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 Columbia Law Review 1081 (1997), co-authored with Daniel F. Spulber.
Monopoly and the Mandate of Canada Post, 14 Yale Journal on Regulation 1 (1997), co-authored with Daniel F. Spulber.
Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 New York University Law Review 851 (1996), co-authored with Daniel F. Spulber.
Stranded Costs, 18 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 835 (1995), co-authored with William J. Baumol.
The Line-Item Veto Amendment, 80 Cornell Law Review 1498 (1995).
Competition and Regulatory Policies for Interactive Broadband Networks, 68 Southern California Law Review 1203 (1995), co-authored with Robert W. Crandall.
The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 Yale Journal on Regulation 171 (1994), co-authored with William J. Baumol.
Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 California Law Review 1209 (1993) (review essay).
War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 New York University Law Review 1402 (1992).
Why Did President Bush Repudiate the “Inherent” Line-Item Veto?, 9 Journal of Law & Politics 39 (1992), co-authored with Thomas A. Smith.
The Inverse Coase Theorem and Declarations of War, 41 Duke Law Journal 325 (1991).
To Declare War, 41 Duke Law Journal 27 (1991).
Takeover Premiums, Appraisal Rights, and the Price Elasticity of a Firm’s Publicly Traded Stock, 25 Georgia Law Review 783 (1991), co-authored with Susan E. Woodward.
Corporate Takeovers, the Commerce Clause, and the Efficient Anonymity of Shareholders, 84 Northwestern University Law Review 1092 (1990), co-authored with Susan E. Woodward.
Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Northwestern University Law Review 437 (1990), co-authored with Thomas A. Smith.
The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke Law Journal 1162.
The Recommendation Clause, 77 Georgetown Law Journal 2079 (1989).
The “New Payola” and the American Record Industry: Transactions Costs and Precautionary Ignorance in Contracts for Illicit Services, 10 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 521 (1987), co-authored with David E. Kronemyer.
Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 Columbia Law Review 1121 (1983).
A Framework for Administering the 1916 Antidumping Act: Lessons from Antitrust Economics, 18 Stanford Journal of International Law 377 (1982).
Antitrust Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, 30 Kansas Law Review 491 (1982).
The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 Journal of Political Economy 429 (1981), co-authored with Michael K. Block and Frederick C. Nold.
Rethinking Antitrust Damages, 33 Stanford Law Review 329 (1981) (student note).
The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 Georgetown Law Journal 1131 (1980), co-authored with Michael K. Block.